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Deforestation contributes a quarter of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. 
On the island of Sulawesi in the vicinity of the Lore Lindu National Park, 
smallholders contribute to deforestation processes with their agricultural 
practices, specifically with cocoa plantations.  
This study assesses the impact of carbon sequestration payments for forest 
management systems on the prevailing land use systems. Additionally, the level of 
incentives which induces farmers to adopt sustainable agroforestry practices is 
determined.  
We show that low carbon credit prices have a small impact on household income. 
However, with rising prices, the poorest households can realise an increase of 18 
percent. The majority of the households have an incentive to adopt the more 
sustainable shade intensive agroforestry system and stop deforestation activities 
with prices observed on markets. The cost-efficiency of avoided deforestation, 
compared to biofuels, is demonstrated. The study shows that forestry activities 
provide an important opportunity as climate mitigation strategies. 
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1. Introduction 
Forest cover is decreasing globally and developing countries, especially those in 
tropical areas, experience even higher rates of deforestation due to a variety of 
contributing factors including agricultural expansion. Deforestation causes about a 
quarter of human induced carbon dioxide emissions. Solutions and strategies to actively 
sequester and conserve the remaining stocks of carbon such as Payments for 
Environmental Service (PES) schemes are used as market-based incentives to enforce or 
support sustainable forest management and conservation activities 1.  
On the island of Sulawesi in Indonesia, the forest of Lore Lindu National Park 
(LLNP) covers 220,000 hectares and has been facing encroachment and consequently 
deforestation. The area dedicated to agricultural activities has increased by 20 percent 
during the last two decades, the perennial crop plantations area has tripled and there has 
been expansion into former forest areas, as well as selective and clear-cut logging. A 
village survey in 2001 revealed that 70 percent of the villages bordering the LLNP have 
agricultural land inside the Park 2. The region’s mean annual deforestation rate of 0.3 
percent between 1983 and 2002 3 does not include plantations under shade trees or the 
intensification process among the cocoa agroforestry systems (AFS), whereby farmers 
gradually reduce the shade tree cover. The focus of the present research is twofold: to 
assess the impact of payments for carbon sequestration activities on the land use 
systems of smallholders in the regions bordering the LLNP in Indonesia, and to 
determine if payments provide an incentive for the adoption of more sustainable land 
use practices thus contributing to the conservation of the rainforest margin. 
2. Framework 
The research seeks to understand which level of incentives is needed for farmers 
in the research area to cease further deforestation and land use intensification activities. 
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It reflects the growing international awareness for payment mechanisms and incentives 
for the provision and preservation of environmental services where local actors are 
given payments in return for switching to more sustainable land-use practices and 
ecosystem protection, which usually implies payments by the beneficiaries of the 
environmental services. These payments for environmental services (PES) policies have 
been defined by Wunder 4, as voluntary, conditional agreements between at least one 
“seller” and one “buyer” over a well-defined environmental service – or a land use 
presumed to produce that service.  
In the region around the LLNP four cocoa AFS can be distinguished according to 
the degree of shading and shade tree species, as well as the management intensity: AFS 
I exhibits a high degree of shading with natural forest trees and a low management 
intensity, while AFS IV involves intensive management and fully sun grown cocoa. The 
gross margins of cocoa consistently increase along the cocoa AFS gradient from I 
towards IV 5. The trade-off situation appears to be between the high economic returns of 
cocoa cultivation in shade-free plantations and the lower returns for shade-grown cocoa. 
However, although shade-free cocoa has higher mean yields and substantially higher net 
returns in comparison with shade grown cocoa, the anticipated agronomic risks 
(declining soil nutrient levels), socio-economic dangers (single crop dependency) and 
negative impact on local food security 6 render it unsustainable. Furthermore, AFS I 
provides high biodiversity values and habitat for the native fauna, whereas AFS IV 
plantations reduce the landscape level diversity by eliminating secondary forests on 
fallow land and may adversely affect the soil fertility 7. Thus, to prevent a 
transformation of the AFS to monocultures in the region, economic incentives are 
required. Price premiums, as used for fair trade and organic coffee, or alternatively 
carbon certificates, could offer an incentive for the more shade grown, biodiversity rich 
and sustainable cocoa AFS and slow down the intensification process.  
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Another contributing factor is related to land sales. In the 1990s many Bugis 
people settled into the research area and have since started to buy land from the local 
Kaili and Kulawi households. In many cases this land is obtained by clearing primary 
forest on the border of the National Park 8 9. The local groups consider themselves the 
owners of the village territory and therefore do not need to buy land, but realise the 
opportunity to sell land. The additional income generated is usually used for ceremonial 
purposes, which require substantial amounts of cash 10. 
The debate with respect to reducing emission from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD) has gained momentum after the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference in 2007. Before this, few 
avoided deforestation projects existed and there was much scepticism over their 
implementation and success. Laurance 11 saw the potential for a viable mechanism for 
using tradable carbon offsets to protect rainforests. Reducing deforestation can 
significantly cut greenhouse gas emissions and developing countries, especially forest-
rich nations, could potentially gain large revenues from carbon credits. Ebeling and 
Yasue 12 calculate revenues of between €1.5-9.1 billion annually if the deforestation rate 
is reduced 10 percent and carbon prices range from €5-30 tCO2e-1. 
3. Data and Methods 
Given its reliability for studying the impact of policy activities 13, we chose a 
comparative static linear programming model to simulate the farmers’ reactions to 
interventions and the effect of technology changes on economic decisions about natural 
resource use management. As an input for the model, the gross margins for the main 
cropping activities paddy rice, upland rice, maize and cocoa were calculated. Forest 
conversion activities based on various economic-political-environmental parameters 
from the research region were included to realistically portray smallholders’ behaviour. 
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The solution procedure maximises the farm’s total gross margin (TGM) by finding the 
optimal set of activities for the household type with the respective restrictions of farm 
size, suitability of the land for various crops, food security, credit limit (formal and 
informal), family workforce, and peak seasonal labour requirements (Table 1).  
The data on existing agricultural production systems was collected in 2006 
through a random sample of 46 households in six villages bordering the LLNP. 
Households were categorized according to their dominant AFS resulting in four 
household types (HHI - HHIV). Household type I, who consists mainly of the local 
groups, has the lowest credit limit and the least cultivated land, which is mainly 
dedicated to cocoa AFS I. Household types II and III have an increasing credit limit and 
most land available for cultivation, dedicated largely to AFS II and AFS III, 
respectively. Within these household classes the share of migrants becomes more 
dominant. Household type IV, which is mainly non-local, predominantly grows AFS 
IV. However, its credit limit is the second highest and its land availability is the same as 
that of household type I which could influence their adoption of the more intensive 
production system. Using a poverty assessment tool based on principle component 
analysis 14, we note that there is a poverty gradient to be found from HHI towards HHIV. 
Within type I, 67 percent belong to the poorest households, whereas 63 percent of the 
type IV households can be categorised as better off. The households of the two other 
categories fall into all three welfare groups.  
According to the Kyoto protocol, all credits from sink projects have a temporary 
status and expire after a certain time. Afforestation projects are awarded a temporary 
certificate of emission reductions (tCER) activity under the CDM, which are limited to 
five years, after which they can be re-issued. Once the tCER are not re-certified, a 
permanent solution is needed to fulfil the reduction requirements. As we envisaged a 
total project horizon of 25 years, we assume the tCER will be issued five times, 
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assuming that the credits are synchronous with the commitment periods 15, 16. To 
counter the incentives for sun-grown cocoa plantations we advocate accounting for the 
annual net rate of carbon accumulation of the shading trees in the AFS I, II and III as 
estimated by Brown et al. 17 and included in the carbon budget for the AFS I, II and III. 
The tCER for the first five year crediting period are related to the cumulative carbon 
storage of the AFS system. The first credits are generated after five years. These tCER 
expire after five years, but are reissued in year 10 together with additional tCER. The 
same procedure is applied for the following 5-year periods until the last issuance of 
tCER in year 25, and reflects the total net storage of CO2 since the project started.  
The low prices for forestry tCERs reflect their need to be replaced by permanent 
ones at some point in the future. Therefore, the value of the temporary credits can be 
seen as the difference between the current permanent credit price and the discounted 
value of the future permanent credit price:  
Td
TCER
P
CERPtCERP *)( +
−=
100
                                                         (1) 
where CER0 is the price of the CERs today and CERT the price of permanent 
CERs discounted at rate d*  found in Annex I-countries and T is the expiring time of 
tCER 18.  
For the conversion the CER prices are assumed to be constant over time (p CER 0 
= p CER T), and a three percent discount rate (d*) is taken, which reflects the current 
low interest rates in Annex I countries 19. As a tCER has a duration of five years, its 
value according to the equivalence relation in (1) is only about 14 percent of that of a 
permanent credit.  
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The annual remuneration to the farmer was obtained for each land-use system 
through the calculation of the net present value, using equation (2), where d represents 
the discount rate in Indonesia and T the 5 year periods from year 5 until 25. The 
calculations refer to the net carbon accumulation. 
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For the linear programming model the net present values are converted to 
annuities, in order to show the annual payments which the farmer would receive from a 
25 year sequestration project.  
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Impact of carbon payments on smallholders’ land use systems 
Low carbon credit prices of €5 tCO2e-1 result in annuity payments of 4 percent of 
the cocoa gross margin for high shade AFS (€100 ha-1), and less than 1 percent of the 
sun-grown AFS cocoa gross margin (€1,460 ha-1) whereas prices of €25 tCO2e-1 result 
in payments of 18 and 2 percent respectably. As the net carbon accumulation is similar 
between all four systems, the variation between the four AFS is very small. However, 
the highest carbon sequestration payments are always obtained for the high shade AFS 
and decline towards the AFS III. AFS IV obtains mid-range payments because the 
cocoa trees are more densely planted in comparison to the other three shaded systems.  
Baseline TGMs of the crop activities at the household level were calculated. 
Although the cocoa gross margins increase in profitability along the cocoa AFS 
intensification gradient from I towards IV, local farmers do not only employ necessarily 
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the AFS with the highest gross margin. The factors and circumstances for this (distance 
of the plot to the forest, traditional land use practices and cultural preferences) are not 
reflected in the model. The baseline exhibits an increase of the TGM from crop 
activities from HHI towards HHIV which mirrors the poverty gradient. Hence, the 
wealth gradient from household type I towards household type IV is corroborated.  
Results from the linear programming model indicate that payments for carbon 
sequestration has a limited impact in absolute terms on the TGM between the four 
household types (Table 2) - between €10 and €70 annually. The relative impact is the 
most pronounced for the household type I (a potential increase of 18 percent at €25 
tCO2e-1), whereas for household type IV the corresponding impact is almost negligible. 
However, at current carbon prices no switches between the different systems are 
observed.  
In assessing whether carbon payments were an incentive for households to adopt 
the biodiversity rich, shade intensive agroforestry system, credits were targeted only 
towards the first two agroforestry systems in recognition of the functionality of their 
high-level ecosystem.  The results indicate that with carbon credit prices of up to 32€ 
tCO2e-1 the first three household types will adopt more of the sustainable agroforestry 
systems. These prices are in a range of offset credits to be observed on carbon markets 
currently and lower than organic cocoa price premiums. Only household type IV would 
need very high credit prices of 185€ tCO2e-1 to induce him to adopt more of the less 
intensive cocoa production practices. 
4.2. Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation  
The discussion on REDD usually focuses on the national level, but incentives can 
also be set at the local level, as agricultural activities are often a major driving force of 
conversion processes. Although the arrangements as to who should be paid for avoided 
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deforestation has yet to be resolved, for this case study we appraise the feasibility of 
compensation payments being made to farmers with a simple projection. The current 
estimate for the carbon content of the LLNP forest is 435 tCO2e ha-1 20. Assuming that 
the current deforestation rate of 0.3 percent is reduced to 0, annual emissions of 13 
tCO2e ha-1 could be avoided. Depending on the prices paid for avoided emissions from 
deforestation, payments between €65 and €326 per hectare could arise .  
At €12 per ton the evolving payments are sufficiently high enough to provide an 
incentive for the household types I and II to stop forest conversion activities. Increasing 
prices to €23 tCO2e-1 avoided would stimulate household type III to desist from further 
tree cutting. Household type I obtains a much lower cocoa gross margin and, hence, 
needs a much lower compensation payment to stop forest conversion. In comparison, 
household type IV receives a very high gross margin for the intensively managed cocoa 
and needs a credit price of €54 tCO2e-1 avoided.  
As mentioned earlier, households from the local ethnic groups often sell the land 
to Bugi migrants who tend to have more intensively managed cocoa agroforestry 
systems (see also Table 1). As the income gained through land sales is often spend on 
ceremonial purposes, local households will convert further forest to fulfil their 
subsistence needs. Compensation payments specifically targeted towards the shade 
intensive AFS I and II, which are mainly cultivated by the local ethnic groups, could 
provide a solution to this situation as the payments will enable the poorest households to 
escape poverty and address the need to convert additional forest to obtain more income 
and/or land.  
To determine if focussing only on agricultural production activities is a cost-
efficient solution for the abatement of greenhouse gases, we compare the abatement 
costs of alternative biofuels to the opportunity costs of conserving the LLNP forest. 
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These are calculated by converting the net present values of the average cocoa 
agroforestry system, as well as the AFS IV to annuities, to derive the annual payments 
from a 100 year project horizon and divide these by the annually avoided tons of CO2e 
per hectare when completely reducing deforestation. Although bioethanol production 
from sugar cane in Brazil is the most cost-efficient solution with negative abatement 
costs of –27 € tCO2e-1, the avoided deforestation of the LLNP (AD LLNP 53 €CO2e-1) 
is a firm second option and far more effectual than the remaining biofuel options. These 
numbers do not include other environmental services provided by the forest (which raise 
its value even further) or the additional environmental costs caused through diverting 
land from previous agricultural activities or forest to biofuel production. However, the 
transaction costs of a REDD project have also not been included in the calculation of 
the abatement costs for avoiding deforestation, which would lower its benefits.  
Therefore, in the search for cost-efficient solutions for the abatement of 
greenhouse gases among activities in the agricultural sector for Germany and other 
developed countries, it is reasonable to invest in the conservation of the LLNP before 
investing in other biofuel strategies to mitigate climate change.  
5. Conclusions 
This study demonstrates the importance to include smallholders when targeting 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and searching for policy approaches as the 
uncontrolled agricultural expansion at forest frontiers undeniably contributes to its 
conversion and loss. Market-based mechanisms and incentive schemes, such as carbon 
credits, can offer solutions for the sustainable management and conservation of forests. 
We derived that per hectare payments for carbon sequestration of cocoa 
agroforestry systems are the highest for fully shaded land use systems, they hardly differ 
between the systems. Depending on the certificate prices, a farmer could obtain between 
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€6 and €28 per hectare for the carbon sequestration of the cocoa AFS. Although at €5 
tCO2e-1 the additional remuneration for the AFS in general is quite low, with carbon 
certificate prices at the upper end, the poorest households can realise an 18 percent 
increase of their gross margin from cropping activities with the introduction of 
payments and also realise the highest increase in absolute terms of their gross margin. 
Additionally, they provide the second highest (and only marginally lower than the 
highest) environmental benefit in terms of the annual carbon sequestration rate of their 
cocoa agroforestry systems. Therefore, the importance of the carbon payments is not so 
much the absolute impact itself, but more importantly which household type derives 
more benefit. Payments specifically targeted towards the high-shade AFS indirectly 
benefit the poorer households from the local ethnic group. In turn, this additional 
income could reduce their need to sell their land to the migrants.  
Carbon certificates could also be used as a price premium to foster the adoption of 
the shade intensive AFS I and II. Although farmers of the household types I-III would 
need differentiated prices to stimulate the switch towards the more sustainable land use 
systems, current carbon market prices could doubtlessly be sufficient. Additionally, the 
analysis shows that compensation payments calculated at current carbon rates is 
sufficient incentive for three household types to cease deforestation reduction, which 
ultimately leads to avoided greenhouse gas emissions. The high net-revenues for fully 
sun grown cocoa make it very difficult to provide viable and financially attractive 
alternative activities for the richer farmers.  
Carbon payments applied in general to all AFS will not have a great impact in 
terms of a contribution to environmental services. However, if other criteria, such as the 
provision of further environmental services are included, specific systems can be 
targeted in order to promote a switch towards these AFS. For carbon payments to be 
efficient and promote a shift towards land uses with higher environmental benefits, 
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payments targeted towards medium to high shade intensive land use systems are 
needed. Carbon payments seem to benefit poorer households relatively more than the 
better off. A win-win situation, where both deforestation processes and poverty can be 
reduced with carbon payments, is possible. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of household classes I – IV 
 Household class 
 I II III IV 
Total cultivated land (ha) 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.5 
Cocoa AFS I (ha) 1.49 0.24 0 0 
Cocoa AFS II (ha) 0.77 1.31 1.09 0.33 
Cocoa AFS III (ha) 0.25 1.16 1.73 0 
Cocoa AFS IV (ha) 0.02 0 0 1.72 
Family labour days per month     32.4 29.5 34.4 31.6 
Credit limit (€/year) 33 720 1,015 570 
Ethnicity (% non-local HHs) 0 19 22 80 
 
Table 2. Total gross margins for the household types for different CER 
price scenarios 
 Household class 
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Total gross margin (€ yr-1) I II III IV 
Baseline  375 1,063 1,331 2,705 
Scenario 1           CER €5 389 1,076 1,344 2,715 
Scenario 2          CER €12 408 1,094 1,361 2,729 
Scenario 3          CER €25  443 1,128 1,312 2,756 
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